Human Events *A Weekly Analysis for the American Citizen*

Editorial Office 1710 Rhode Island Ave., N. W., WASHINGTON 6, D. C. *Telephone* NATIONAL 2066

VOL. VII, No. 26, *Issue Number* 335, JUNE 28, 1950 ★ *Editor:* FRANK C. HANIGHEN

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA RECEIVED JUL 6 1950 BERKELEY

STUPIDITY OR TREASON?

by William Henry Chamberlin

It was a few months before the fall of the Czarist regime in Russia. Professor Paul Milyukov, leader of the opposition Constitutional Democratic Party, was delivering an indictment of the government before the Duma, or parliament. (It is perhaps worth remembering that in Czarist Russia, in striking contrast to the Soviet Union, there were real opposition parties and there were parliamentary speeches critical of the government.)

Milyukov asserted that pro-German influences were at work in the Russian administrative apparatus. Backing up this general charge with specific allegations, he repeated over and over again the accusing question: "Is this stupidity -- or treason?"

A good many Americans may well have repeated Milyukov's question as the bizarre, disturbing and still fragmentary story of Communist espionage, infiltration and pervasive influence in Government agencies continued to unfold. It is America's misfortune that no one in the position of Igor Gouzenko, Soviet cipher clerk who decisively cracked the Canadian spy ring, had "chosen freedom" in this country.

Because of the character of his work Gouzenko had names and facts about the Canadian spy ring, organized by the Soviet military attache in Ottawa, at his fingers' tips. He was able to deliver to the amazed and unsuspecting Canadian authorities a neatly packaged, coherent case.

Revelations of Communist underground activity in this country, on the other hand, have come out in confusing, piecemeal fashion. Soviet intelligence work inherits two very efficient and experienced traditions. Espionage was one of the best developed services in Czarist Russia. And, in those days, Russian revolutionaries developed extraordinary ingenuity in dodging the police.

One of the first principles of every efficient espionage organization, and one that is very faithfully practiced by Soviet foreign intelligence agencies, is not to let any individual know too much about the organization as a whole. The three individuals who have contributed most to uncovering the Communist underground in the United States, Louis Budenz, Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley, frankly admit that they were only cogs in a very big machine during their periods of Communist service. Many aspects of Soviet espionage were outside the sphere of their activity and knowledge.

Copyright 1950 by HUMAN EVENTS, INC.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet the verified record up to the present time is sufficient to confound the innocent and not-so-innocent individuals who try to brush off the fact that there is a disloyalty problem of serious proportions with stereotyped cries of "hysteria", "witch hunt", "red herring", etc.

The Canadian spy ring was not the figment of some diseased imagination. When the German refugee, Dr. Klaus Fuchs, confessed that, with a still undisclosed number of American accomplices, he conveyed important atomic secrets to Soviet agents there was unfortunately no reason to suspect the truth of what he said. There was sufficient evidence to convince juries that Alger Hiss and Judith Coplon were guilty as charged.

Unless the Department of Justice was flagrantly lying, some highly top-secret Government material was found in the office of the pro-Communist magazine Amerasia. Between the cases where there is a strong presumption of downright disloyalty, exploited by a foreign Power, and the sheer stupidity that caused respectable magazines to go overboard for Soviet propaganda during the war, and Hollywood to dabble in idyllic pro-Soviet films, there is a large and very disquieting area in which emotional bias prompted decisions which were in Soviet, rather than in American interest.

II

One cannot understand the still incomplete and unfinished story of Communist infiltration without recalling that emotional pro-Soviet bias was the occupational disease of a considerable part of the American intelligentsia during the Thirties. The Soviet regime is perhaps the only tyranny in history that has maintained over so long a period the uncritical sympathies of individuals who liked to regard themselves as friends of all good causes.

Educated Americans, almost without exception, repudiated and denounced the violations of the rights of man represented by the regimes of Hitler and Mussolini. But many of them flunked the moral test presented by the Soviet regime in Russia.

Intellectuals bowed before the shrine of a regime that stripped the intellectual in Russia of his last shred of self-respect and independence. Individuals who quivered with indignation over occasional violations of civil liberties in the United States sang the praises of a regime which recognized no civil liberties whatever. Certain artists, playwrights, writers and musicians whose knowledge of the facts involved was sketchy and limited, to say the least, developed the habit of tossing off blanket endorsements of the wholesale death sentences that followed Soviet political trials.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In this widespread and quite unprecedented emotional commitment to a foreign government one can find the seeds of treason in some cases; the clue to the success of Communist infiltration tactics.

III

International espionage is a very old game indeed. But, in the United States, as elsewhere, something new has been added by the growing up of a Soviet fifth column, composed of individuals who, for conviction rather than for money, are prepared to betray their own country for the sake of the Kremlin. There was no serious or effective German or Japanese espionage in this country during the war.

But the status of the Soviet Union as an Ally whose motives and intentions could not be safely questioned offered a golden opportunity for many Communist infiltration methods. In his book, Defeat in Victory, the Polish Ambassador to the United States at that time, the Honorable Jan Ciechanowski, reports:

> "Some of the new war agencies actively conducted what could only be termed pro-Soviet propaganda.
>
> "So-called American propaganda broadcasts to occupied Poland were outstanding proofs of this tendency. Notorious pro-Soviet propagandists and obscure foreign Communists and fellow travellers were entrusted with these broadcasts."

Three prominent employees of the Polish branch of the OWI after the war appeared in the service of Communist-dominated Poland where one of them now edits a pro-Communist paper. Not only the OWI but other wartime agencies opened their doors of employment wide to Communist sympathizers, while they pursued a policy of excluding individuals of proved democratic sympathies who were known as strong anti-Communists. It can easily be imagined how much warping of American policy was the result.

The detailed, substantiated testimony of Whittaker Chambers, backed by the most eloquent inarticulate witness, the Hiss typewriter on which the incriminating documents were copied, convinced a jury that Alger Hiss was guilty of perjury. This raises the still unanswered question whether and how far Hiss used his influence, for pro-Soviet purposes, as one of the few civilian advisors at the Yalta conference and as chief director of preparations for the San Francisco conference which launched the United Nations.

Probably more important, although less publicized than the case of Alger Hiss, are the implications of the alleged Communist sympathies of the late Harry Dexter White. White was mentioned both by Whittaker Chambers and by Elizabeth Bentley as a source of information for Communist spy rings. Neither Chambers nor Bentley, despite the abuse

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hurled at them by the people whom Arthur Koestler calls "anti-anti-Communists", has been proved inaccurate on any major piece of testimony.

White was the right-hand man of Henry Morgenthau, and the chief architect of the Morgenthau Plan for the deliberate economic ruin and destruction of Germany. A point that has been generally overlooked is that the Morgenthau Plan called for the policing of Germany exclusively by the troops of Germany's continental neighbors, excluding American and British armed forces.

Is not this exactly what Stalin would have desired? A searching investigation of the origins of the Morgenthau Plan is long overdue.

IV

Out of the blasts and counterblasts set off by Senator McCarthy's charges there emerges a considerable core of hard indisputable fact. Agents of the OSS and the FBI discovered large quantities of stolen government documents in the office of the magazine Amerasia, a publication edited by Philip Jaffe, a man of long Communist front associations. Many of these documents were top-secret and were of high political and military importance.

In the opinion of the FBI, communicated to Under-Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and to the State Department security officer, Julius Holmes, there was an airtight case for the prosecution of six persons who were arrested in connection with the case. But, for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained, the prosecution was allowed to peter out, being dropped in some cases and most ineffectively pressed in others.

The Institute of Pacific Relations, which supplied many supposed experts for service in the Far East during the war, included in its staff some persons later revealed as Communists and many whose writings would stamp them as fellow travellers.

What has been going on, what must often inspire the question "Stupidity or Treason?" is a guerrilla war for the mind of America. It may be doubted whether guerrilla tactics are ever countered without some excesses. But the man who "sees a Communist under every bed" is no more absurd and is probably less dangerous than the complacent individual who doesn't recognize Communist agents and sympathizers who are right in bed with him.

Quotation up to a paragraph is permitted with credit to HUMAN EVENTS. For reproduction or more extensive quotation address requests to HUMAN EVENTS, 1710 Rhode Island Avenue, N. W., Washington 6, D. C. Trial subscription, three months for $3. Six months, $5.50. One year, $10. Two years, $18. Domestic airmail (including APO and FPO) one year, $12.00; foreign (regular mail) one year, $11. Foreign airmail rates on request. Please remit in U.S.A. DOLLARS. Allow two weeks for new subscriptions or change of address to become effective.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not Merely Gossip *A Supplement to* Human Events Vol. VII, No. 26

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA JUL 5 1950

By Frank C. Hanighen June 28, 1950

THE CRISIS: In the fluid situation today, those to whom we have talked here recognize that Truman's move of yesterday -- use of air and navy to defend Korea -- is a dangerous gamble, however necessary he deems it. If Russia backs down, there will be no immediate general war. But if Russia does not retreat -- then Armageddon is on us in earnest. The die has been cast.

However, as we go to press we must report a less uncompromising view of a diplomat who knows his Asia as well as Russia. While approving the President's stand, he wonders if something in between these two alternatives may be possible. Korea, he suggests, may become another Spain (of 1936-39), a localized area of conflict while negotiations go on. One danger that might arise is that the Chinese Communists in neighboring Manchuria would reinforce the Northern Koreans. Military experts in Washington doubt that, in such a case, Southern Korea could be held. Also, these military observers wonder if concurrently Soviet Russia might move in some other far-off theater of the cold war -- say, in Iran.

Our friend points to what he calls the "defensive" pattern of the President's apparently inflexible statement. It runs: defend Formosa -- yes; but Chiang is not to attack the mainland, and the final disposition of that island awaits a peace treaty. Defend Southern Korea -- yes; but our activities must not go beyond the 38th parallel, the originally agreed-upon dividing line between Communist-dominated and U.S.-dominated Korea. In short, do not disturb the status quo. Such a policy offers Moscow a way out.

One source of confidence is seen: that the situation in the area of conflict is now in the competent military hands of General Douglas MacArthur. But since President Truman and his advisers will direct the diplomatic moves, some observers wonder whether we will be successful in avoiding full war, in view of the incredible bungling of those official policy directors. The complete somersault executed by Truman is gravely pondered: last January Truman bluntly said that Formosa was not essential to our defense in the Pacific; yesterday he said, "the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area." Can one make sense out of that? Also, it has been established that, despite a sizeable Congressional appropriation of funds available to Korea since last October, none had been sent or even allocated up to the end of March. The key to such tragic anomalies may be found in a statement given by Professor Owen Lattimore on July 17, 1949, in the Compass: "The thing to do, therefore, is to let Korea fall but not let it look as though we pushed it." Was the withholding of the arms from Korea a deliberate "pushing" -- similar to the failure to give arms to Chiang's Nationalist armies in the past four years?

How one can submissively stand silent "behind the President", as the arrogant Connally urged yesterday, in view of what has happened, is beyond comprehension, unless we are completely totalitarianized already. Senators Kem and Watkins tried to make the Upper House assert its constitutional role, deploring the fact that the Administration had not come to Congress in this situation. But the counsels of Connally seem to prevail. Still, we hear a new slogan on some lips -- one that could and should run through the entire country -- "The men of Yalta must go."

* * * * *

Copyright 1950 by Human Events, Inc.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TYDINGS-ISM IN THE CRISIS: (As we go to press, Edna Lonigan sends us the following from Capitol Hill.) In spite of revelations in hearings that Foreign Service Officer John S. Service had "slanted" reports in favor of Chinese Communists, and in spite of his admission that he had given secret information to Amerasia, the State Department Loyalty Board yesterday cleared him -- right in the middle of the international crisis. How much confidence will the people continue to have in the Department in view of this action? The American people feel concern, if worst comes to worst, about the safety of their sons. How will they feel, should their young be sent on amphibious landings in Asia, while "security risks" hold office and help shape policy? They do not want the President to maintain security risks, nor to wait for direct proof of security risk. For the same reason, General George Washington did not think it necessary to wait until Benedict Arnold had delivered West Point to the enemy before he acted. If the President still remains timid in this vital matter, then the Opposition has a duty that transcends all politics and appeals to "stand by the President". Washington said, "Put none but Americans on guard tonight." The words have immediacy.

* * * * *

THE REVOLT OF THE SOUTH: Unless the international crisis smothers it, the revolt of the South should emerge as a major news development of the past week. The defeat of Senator Graham in North Carolina on June 24 is a symbol of this rising against the Fair Deal. Graham was defeated by Willis Smith in the run-off primary (which in Southern states constitutes the real election) after Graham had led the race in the initial primary of three weeks ago. Various factions rallied behind Smith, whose conservative record stood in contrast to the Fair Deal record of Graham. It is agreed by all observers that resentment against FEPC, feeling against various "anti-segregation" developments and anti-Communism turned the tide in Smith's favor. It is also remarked that the Supreme Court's anti-segregation decisions came after the initial primary (in which Graham led) and the run-off which effectively elected Smith. The final result of the elections is all the more significant because North Carolina is a Southern state which has remained especially faithful to the New Deal and the Fair Deal.

Rising feeling in the South has been reflected on Capitol Hill. A prominent Southern Senator confided to us recently: "We won't need to filibuster the FEPC bill. The Administration isn't serious about it. But that doesn't lessen our bitterness. The Supreme Court decisions make us think that, no matter how successful we may be in blocking anti-Southern legislation, the Court can put over the measures in the form of judicial decisions." Other Southerners are similarly angry about the Court's decision against Texas in the tidelands oil case. That decision reinforced conviction that States' Rights have little chance against the expanding power of centralized government.

But the most brilliant Capitol Hill reflection of the "revolt of the South" has been a remarkable volte face in the Senate among Southern leaders. It may be recalled that early in 1949, a number of Northern Republicans privately urged the Southerners to join with Republicans in a formal alliance against the Fair Deal. But the Southerners did not respond. However, in the past week it was the Southerners who urged the Republicans to make such an alliance. So far the GOP remains coy. Senator Russell of Georgia has been particularly active in this matter. And the name of Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia pops up in such conversations -- as a man around whom conservatives of both North and South could rally. So far these tentatives lie in the realm of "cloakroom" discussion. But whether they bear fruit or not in any real alliance between North and South, there is little doubt that the old States' Rights spirit is hardening and the White House faces a tough problem with the Southern wing of the Democratic Party.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Book Events

Roosevelt in Retrospect; A Profile in History, by John Gunther. New York: Harper and Brothers. $3.75. Reviewed by Walter Trohan.

This book is neither good history, nor good biography, under the definition of Cervantes that historians ought to be precise, faithful and unprejudiced; and that neither interest nor fear, hatred nor affection, should make them swerve from the way of truth. Nevertheless Roosevelt in Retrospect is not without interest. Despite the jacket blurb which proclaims that Mr. Gunther found himself "almost drowned" by hitherto untouched material, the book contains little that has not been revealed in the flood of memoirs now available. In fact Mr. Gunther has done hardly more than a rewrite of the books of Eleanor Roosevelt, Frances Perkins, Robert Sherwood, Elliott Roosevelt and others, being careful to eschew Dr. Charles A. Beard, John T. Flynn and those who have challenged the official family picture.

The interest lies in the fact that the volume signals the adoption of a new line in preserving the "great man of history" legend. The line has now been shifted to take care of discrepancies between the propagandized picture of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the emerging picture of official realities which can no longer be denied. In the light of the post-war revelations of policy, Mr. Gunther asks himself: "Was Roosevelt 'Neutral'?" And he answers himself right to the point: "Of Course Not." This admission was not made in the first flush of Rooseveltiana.

Although Mr. Gunther admits that FDR did not "need to be sold on the major premises" (of the necessity of the U.S. entering the war) by Churchill, he is not prepared to make any changes in the Pearl Harbor story to meet the lines drawn by the most important testimony in the Congressional probe of that disaster. He subscribes to the Sherwood assertion that FDR was "rescued" by Tokio from an impossible dilemma. He concedes that the attack did come because of American policy, but argues that the policy was defensive and stubbornly insists that anyone who holds that war was coming and FDR failed to alert Hawaiian commanders is one of "those stubborn Roosevelt haters". Inevitably Gunther concludes that had he lived FDR would have solved all the problems he bequeathed the nation and the world at his death.

But there are difficulties in establishing a "new line" in the Roosevelt myth-making. Mr. Gunther flounders badly on the issue of Unconditional Surrender. The most casual study of history offers ample evidence that such a formula produces an unworkable peace. After disproving FDR's own statement that he thought up the formula on the spur of the moment, and after attributing it to distrust of his own advisers, bravado or desire to protect Churchill, Gunther startles us with: "In any case the formula did little if any harm. It had small effect on the major course of events." He neglected to punctuate this statement with an exclamation point.

Mr. Gunther finds himself frequently over his depth in his attempted analysis of FDR's character, but manages to cling to the official myth as a life preserver. Thus, at one point he states that the plain fact of the matter is that "Roosevelt did not like to think". But he struggles to the surface with the conclusion that the Roosevelt brain "was an extremely powerful intellect". He characterizes his idol as "one of the supreme brain pickers of all time", but hastens to add that "genius is, by one definition, someone with infinite capacity to make use of everybody and everything". And so on.

There is no doubt that Mr. Gunther shows himself, in this book, in his best "inside manner", nor that he does his best with the "new line". But he is hardly the impartial assessor needed to appraise the character of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Walter Trohan, Chief of the Washington Bureau of the Chicago Tribune, has covered the White House and Capitol for the past 16 years.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The I Ching, or Book of Changes: the Richard Wilhelm translation rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes; foreword by C. C. Jung. New York: Pantheon Books, 2 vols., $7.50. Reviewed by J. M. Lalley.

The Book of Changes is one of the famous "six classics" of early Confucianism. Chinese tradition assigns the compilation of it to King Wen, founder of the Chou dynasty, in the Twelfth Century B.C.; but while this may be an exaggeration of its antiquity, there is no doubt that it was already ancient in the time of Confucius. (c. 551-479 B.C.) It has probably had greater influence upon Chinese thought, character and culture than any other single work; but because of its intricate and obscure symbolisms, Western students were for long unable to make much sense of it. Now, however, as interpreted by Professor Fung Yu-Lan and other modern scholars, it has been found to afford a key to Chinese philosophy that uncovers both contrasts and parallels in the history of Occidental ideas.

Originally, the Book of Changes seems to have been little more than a sort of manual of divination, a set of rules for interpreting the various configurations obtained from shuffling little bundles of long and short sticks of milfoil, or yarrow. By casting these sticks and arranging them horizontally a hexigram, or six line figure, is obtained. Each line of the hexigram consists of either one long stick or two short ones. Any of 64 patterns is possible, but each represents some combination of two of the eight basic trigrams, or three line patterns. The extreme combinations are represented by a double Ch'ien, consisting of six long sticks, making six unbroken lines, and a double K'un, or twelve short sticks arranged in six lines, each divided at the center. Thus we have concepts of odd and even, corresponding, after a fashion, to the male and female numbers of the Pythagoreans. Ch'ien, or perfect oddness, is the symbol of Heaven or Deity; that is, of the creative, active, male principle of the universe; K'un, or perfect evenness, is the earth and by symbolic extension the receptive, passive and female principle. Professor Fung and others have suggested that these concepts may be traceable to some primitive cosmological myth, whereby the world was imagined to be the offspring of the union of some god and goddess, possibly the sun and moon; but this theory was rather scornfully rejected by Wilhelm. In both Taoist and Confucian philosophy, at any rate, the complementary opposites have been purged of any anthropomorphic significance; they stand for the interaction of universal forces which are in some ways analogous to spirit and matter in the dualistic philosophies of the West. Thus out of the Book of Changes grew the doctrine of Yang and Yin, differently elaborated by the followers of Confucius and of Lao Tzu. The Confucian theory is developed in a series of ten commentaries, or "wings", some of them attributed to Sage himself, that were appended to the book. Here, too, is expounded the Confucianist version of Tao or harmonious relationships of Yang and Yin in the various categories of nature and of human life. In the ethical sphere these tao represent ideal social attitudes to which the individual person should strive to conform. Thus by some Confucianists the doctrine of tao is related to the "rectification of names" demanded in the Analects. That is to say a sovereign or subject or father or son conforms to his tao by being what the name of his status implies. At the bottom of the whole doctrine is a principle of negation or contradiction, comparable to the "thesis and antithesis" of the Hegelians. When anything in nature is developed to an extreme it reverts to its opposite. What follows from this is not the Hegelian "synthesis", but the famous doctrine of the mean, or virtuous middle way.

The standard English translation of the Book of Changes is James Legge's, often criticized by other sinologists for its "wooliness" and lack of sympathetic insight. Dr. Jung, who perceives in some of the more occult aspects of the work, and in Taoist mysticism generally, an intuitive apprehension of his own theories of the conscious and unconscious, expects that for American readers Legge will now be supplanted by Wilhelm.

1710 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N. W., WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED